Notes for Testimony on DU Petition to Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee: Thursday 9 April 2009
By Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Retired)
Introduction
Good morning. Some of you will recall my previous appearance before this Committee on 28 August last year, accompanied by the Rev Robert Ritchie, the petitioner, and Dr John Peet. Mr Ritchie apologises for not being here this morning, because of work commitments; however, he has delegated his role to me. He and the rest of the DU Education Team, DUET, are most grateful for this second opportunity to present our arguments to the Committee. I hope you have had a chance to read our submissions from that hearing, watched the short statement on DVD by Dr Rosalie Bertell, and read our supplementary submission dated 31 March.
In my previous submission I outlined my personal background as a former British Navy Commander who operated nuclear weapons, and whose final appointment was as Staff Officer (Intelligence) to Commander-in-Chief Fleet at Northwood HQ near London, in charge of round-the-clock intelligence support for the Fleet. Having taken voluntary redundancy in 1981, I was released after the Falklands War.
I then explained how I became sufficiently concerned about the hazards of nuclear electricity generation to testify in 1989 at a Public Inquiry into a second British pressurised water reactor (which was never built), opposing it on safety grounds. Then the break-up of the Soviet Union followed by the 1991 Gulf War caused me to become the first ex-British Commander with nuclear weapon experience to speak out against them.
In October 1991 I became Chair of the UK branch of the World Court Project – which was how I met Dr Kate Dewes, a Christchurch-based pioneer of the international campaign which persuaded the UN General Assembly to ask the International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear deterrence. After Kate and I were married in 1997, we established the Disarmament & Security Centre in our home in Christchurch, as the South Island branch of the NZ Peace Foundation. I immigrated in 1999, and became a NZ citizen two years later.
Since then I have been using my military experience to promote alternative thinking about security and disarmament, and to help build bridges between the military and the peace movement. My latest book, Fallen Idol: Security Without Nuclear Deterrence, will be co-published early next year by Verso Books and the Pamphleteer’s Press in the UK and US.
Supplementary Submission Highlights
We believe that, from recently emerging evidence, the DU issue looks set to surpass the inhumanity of the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam.
We therefore ask the Committee to consider the same evidence about the health risks of use of DU munitions heard by the Belgian Parliament, along with new research emerging since March 2007. Incidentally, the Belgian ban will come into force on 20 June this year.
We remind the Committee how we first became concerned about this issue: the deployment of NZ Defence Force personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. In 2005 DUET organized a speaking tour for Dr Chris Busby, the first international expert on DU to do so. In meetings with Ministers and Brigadier Anne Campbell, he recommended increasing the sensitivity of urine tests on returned personnel. This was partially accepted; however, we discovered resistance to introducing testing to the sensitivity level achieved in the UK.
We suspect this is because, as a waste product of nuclear processing, DU is very cheap and effective. The leading users of DU munitions – the US and UK military – therefore favour its use over alternative more expensive materials (see the briefing note on 120mm anti-tank munitions). Also, the US and UK governments are extremely unwilling to allow field research in Iraq and Afghanistan, which fuels suspicion that our concerns are well-founded.
NZDF Interoperability with a New Zealand Ban
Although the NZDF do not have DU munitions, joint operations with those states whose arsenals do include DU munitions could generate concerns about interoperability in the event of New Zealand instituting a national ban.
We point out, however, that in international prohibitions on weapons such as landmines, chemical and biological weapons and cluster munitions, issues of interoperability were dealt with satisfactorily. For the latest example, see Article 21 of the Cluster Munitions Convention.
New Developments
We draw the Committee’s attention to the following new developments since last August:
• A New Scientist article on 6 September 2008 highlighted research into possible causes of heavy metal toxicity by Dr Busby in collaboration with German Professor Ewald Schnug. They propose a novel mechanism whereby the largest atoms, such as those of heavy metal elements, can all emit electrons causing ionizing radiation when exposed to photons of energy from a wide spectrum of wavelengths. Ionizing radiation is well known as a source of cancer causing damage to living tissues.
• Dr Busby wrote about this and his other concerns about DU in an important article titled “Uranium weapons: why all the fuss?” in UNIDIR’s Disarmament Forum journal issue published in October last year.
• A strongly precautionary approach to the use of DU munitions was evident when member states of the UN expressed their views on DU in December 2008. A large majority (141) adopted resolution A/C.1/63/L.26 – opposed only by the US, UK, France and Israel – inviting governments and relevant international organizations to communicate their views on the potential harmful effects of the use of DU munitions to the Secretary-General by the next UN disarmament session in September this year. DUET notes that the New Zealand Government has not yet submitted its views. By contrast, Belgium made a report which included the following:
The Belgian legislative body made in the end a political appreciation of the matter which took account of the absence of scientific consensus on the effects of depleted uranium, while at the same time applying the precautionary principle, which demands a prudent attitude for as long as scientific certainties have not been established.
DUET considers this eminently wise and balanced position, from a NATO member state which hosts NATO HQ, warrants endorsement by New Zealand.
The Belgian decision, by unanimous vote, to ban DU munitions began with a bill put forward by Dirk Van der Maelen MP. He wrote on 27 March 2008 appealing to all members of the New Zealand Parliament to ban DU munitions (see Appendix 3). On 28 August Mr Van der Maelen spoke by phone to the Committee, expressing compelling reasons for New Zealand to institute a domestic ban.
Following Mr Van der Maelen, the Committee heard from US biostatistician Dr Rosalie Bertell via phonelink from Pennsylvania. Dr Bertell emphasised that the problem is “deeper and larger than the submission has indicated.”
• Since then, on 4 March a campaign was launched for Costa Rica to institute a national ban like Belgium’s. Last week, the Latin American Parliament considered a ban after Costa Rica introduced its proposal.
• Also last week, Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it will fund three research projects to help resolve the uncertainty about the health effects of DU munitions. As a NATO member state, this is a courageous initiative strongly supportive of Belgium. It will be interesting to see if in particular the Obama administration tries to stop the Basra project.
• In what was probably no coincidence, the next day it was reported that NATO is prepared to take a fresh look at the issue.
• Then last Sunday came a report that the Scottish government is under mounting pressure to back an international ban on the use of DU munitions.
Conclusions and Recommendations
With moves in Costa Rica to follow the Belgian ban, and in October this year another opportunity at the next UN Disarmament Session for states to report on the issue, we believe that New Zealand should support Belgium’s precautionary approach. We therefore urge the Committee, having considered the latest concerns regarding DU’s harmful effects, to recommend that:
1) Parliament enact a ban on the manufacture, use, storage, sale, acquisition, supply and transit of inert munitions and armour that contain depleted uranium or any other industrially manufactured uranium.
2) The New Zealand Government submit a report to the UN Secretary-General endorsing Belgium’s precautionary approach on the issue in response to paragraph 2 of UN Resolution A/C.1/63/L.26 dated 16 October 2008.
We believe these steps would contribute powerfully to worldwide pressure for an international ban, and to New Zealand’s standing as a world leader in disarmament.
