Introduction
There has been a global upsurge of interest in nuclear energy and there have been occasional recommendations for its use in NZ. Opposition to such a recommendation based on the key issues of cost, plant safety, emissions, resource availability, the treatment and disposal of nuclear wastes, decommissioning, and nuclear proliferation make its adoption unlikely. I have nonetheless reviewed here the various forms of nuclear reactor available for civil energy generation in the short and medium term, the trend in technologies, and their likely relevance to our local situation as some misleading claims have been made. I conclude that there is no reactor that could realistically be deployed here within the given time frame.

The New Zealand Electricity System
The nature, history and size of our electricity system have a bearing on the ease with which it could accommodate nuclear generation, and I will touch on what I see to be some important features.
Transpower has described the NZ system as “a small islanded network”, based on the small size of the total connected generation (9,000MW is small in international terms), the absence of interconnections to other networks, and the “long and skinny” configuration with load and generation centres of gravity in the north and the south respectively. The HVDC link has facilitated this development, and although the link’s capacity is currently constrained by ageing equipment, it seems certain that by 2012 its ability to transmit up to 1200MW in either direction will have been restored. This is but one shortcoming of a grid whose development has not kept pace with the growth of load and generation in terms of both magnitude and regional trends. Load transfers are constrained at a number of key points, notably with the transfer of power from the south into and across the Auckland isthmus, hence the ongoing controversy over a new 400/220 kV line from Whakamaru to Otahuhu. Strengthening of the grid is being approached as a matter of urgency; this will certainly be required for the satisfactory integration of dispersed sources of renewable energy, and proposed amendments to the governance requirement for the Electricity Commission would address this issue.
There is a limitation on the maximum size of individual generating unit that can be connected to the grid system. Currently the largest units on the system are gas turbines at Otahuhu, Huntly and Taranaki Power stations, all single shaft machines with output in the range 380 to 400 MW. Maximum size is affected by the need for spinning reserve to guard against sudden loss of a unit, as well as the economic need to match the incremental growth of generation with that of load. At least as much spinning reserve is needed (on the same side of any grid constraint) as the load on one spinning shaft. Thus a 1,000MW single shaft nuclear unit would need our three largest gas fired generators to be running unloaded on standby. The advent of larger wind generation facilities adds to the grid stability and reliability constraints in the event of an outage of such large units.
The Electricity Commission has just released Draft Generation Scenarios covering the period out to the year 2037. The five Scenarios involve assumptions ranging from the “Sustainable Path” with maximum exploitation of renewable resources and closure of existing major thermal stations and the Tiwai smelter, to the “High Gas Discovery” Scenario. The latter assumes major new indigenous gas discoveries and the construction of efficient gas-fired thermal plants, together with the development of the most cost-effective renewable sources. A feature of all Scenarios is the construction of diesel- or gas-fired peaking plants in parallel with renewable sources to enhance system security. The assumed average demand growth throughout the study period is of the order of 200MW/annum, and the maximum individual plant or generating unit size under any scenario is of the order of 400MW. Virtually all of the large thermal generating plants in the High Gas Discovery Scenario are assumed to be located in the upper North Island, although coal-fired plants with carbon capture, provisionally allowed-for in the latter part of the planning period, could conceivably be located in Southland.
In any likely scenario the role of nuclear generation would be to provide a base load capability to underpin the renewable generation base, supported by gas-fired peaking units.. It is suggested that in view of the above constraints on the New Zealand grid system, the maximum size of any nuclear reactor and associated single shaft generator would be of the order of 500 MW for at least the next couple of decades.

Requirement for a Nuclear Regulator
The electricity supply industry of New Zealand is regulated by the Electricity Commission, a Crown entity set up under the Electricity Act. Its principal objective is to ensure that electricity is produced and delivered to all classes of consumer in an efficient, fair, reliable and environmentally sustainable manner. To discharge this role it has a small, strong core team of high quality generalists, and engages the services of specialist contractors as appropriate. An additional independent regulatory authority would be required if nuclear generation were added to the mix. The importance attached to the role of the Nuclear Regulator can be gauged from the following:
The IAEA held a Conference of Nuclear Regulators from 60 countries in Moscow in March 2006. A statement released from the Conference included the following declaration: “… the complexity of a nuclear power plant makes it dependent on key factors such as location, management practices and human behaviour – all of which influence safety performance. How can members of the public and stakeholders be assured that a nuclear power plant or any enterprise that has to deal with radioactive material is run safely? This is a job for an independent oversight authority – the regulator.”
Similarly, in his introduction to the “Public Report on the Generic Design Assessment of New Nuclear Reactor Designs”, March 2008, the Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations in the UK described his role thus: “Our job is about protecting people and society from the hazards presented by the nuclear industry. As new nuclear power stations are being considered for the UK, it is right for us as regulators to start our work to examine the safety and security aspects associated with these power stations’ design”.
Key differences between nuclear and conventional thermal power plants are the heat that must be removed following a full plant trip, and the inability to restart a reactor quickly shut down due to neutron capture by short half life Xenon isotopes. Even with the chain reaction completely shut down a nuclear reactor will generate significant heat from fission product decay for long periods. To prevent a “Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)” a long-term stable source of electric power is essential. This is a design requirement of concern to the nuclear regulator, and the type of system in which the nuclear plant is embedded is a significant factor.
The first step in the acceptance of a nuclear reactor design for construction in a particular country is its licensing by the nuclear regulator of that country after due study of all relevant aspects. Were that to become an issue in New Zealand it is likely that our regulator would take a lead from the NRC (USA) or the NII (UK). We would be unlikely to adopt a Chinese, Russian, Indian or even a Japanese design unless it had already received certification by one of the above.
Australia does have an independent nuclear regulator, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority ARPANSA, created under legislation passed in 1998, whose responsibilities include those of our own National Radiation Laboratory, a specialist unit within the Ministry of Health. While it has no civil nuclear power plants, Australia does have many features of a nuclear industry with uranium mines, a research reactor and atomic test sites.

The “Nuclear Renaissance”
Recent developments have been described as a “nuclear renaissance”. In the words of one recent (July 2007) newspaper article2 “Asia is leading the world in the quest for atomic power. … there are at least 110 reactors operating …. Another 18 power reactors are under construction and a further 110 are planned. … China has 5 power reactors under construction, another 63 planned or proposed. India has 8 being built and 24 on the drawing boards.” The list is impressive, but the details are hard to check and the numbers are often inflated. A report3 from the UK, published in March 2006 and using 2005 figures from the IAEA gave the following global picture:
“Altogether 24 reactors are officially under current construction around the world. Nine of the 24 reactors were originally ordered before 1990, and are mostly of dated Russian design. China has ambitious plans (up to 30 reactors) for nuclear construction but currently only has 2 plants on order. India appears to have 8 plants being built (including 2 recent Russian-origin units) but there is some doubt about the commitment or capacity of India to complete these in a timely fashion.”
The Economist reported in September 2007 “Over the next few months America’s Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) expects to receive 12 applications to build nuclear power reactors at 7 different sites. It is preparing to see plans for another 15 at 11 more locations next year.”
In January 2008 the British Government declared its support for a new nuclear power programme that could increase its share of generation to 30% or more. No target was set for the number of reactors to be built, this being left to the market to decide.

Dominant Reactor Designs
Reactors under construction or planned in Asia include units developed locally (Japan, India and China) though based on  Western (generally Westinghouse or General Electric) designs. However in terms of recent or planned construction and out for the next decade at least, there are only three forms of reactor technology4 in serious contention in the UK, Europe or the US: two forms of Light Water Reactor (LWR), the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) and the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR); and the Heavy Water Reactor (HWR). All three are technologies that have been in existence since the beginning of the civil nuclear industry, but in their modern forms are categorised as Generation III or III+. Generation III designs are advanced reactors developed during the 1990s. Generation III+ are yet more recent developments intended for deployment by 2010. The latest designs share the following common features: improved safety systems; modular design to reduce costs and shorten construction times; increased fuel burn-up to improve efficiency and reduce nuclear waste volumes; larger unit size to improve economic competitiveness. A point worth making is that a terrific amount of effort and resources is involved in a particular reactor design and certification is particular to that design.
PWR technology was pioneered by Westinghouse, which was originally an American company but is now owned by Mitsubishi. The advanced passive series of reactors was developed in the US in the 1990s, resulting in the AP600 with an output of 600MW. However it was discovered that the AP600 would not be cost effective on the US market so attempts were made to increase capacity using the same technology.
The Westinghouse AP1000, with a rating close to 1200MW, was the first Generation III+ reactor to be approved by NRC in 2004 and an order has just (April 2008) been placed for a pair to be built in Georgia, USA.
The French have used PWR technology in their nuclear programme since the 1970s. The Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) is a Generation III+ form of PWR reactor designed in a joint venture by French firm Areva and German firm Siemens. During the course of development the reactor’s capacity has been increased to 1750MW to increase economic competitiveness. The first EPR reactor to be built is under construction in Finland, and is due for completion in 2010-11, two years behind schedule and massively over budget. Construction has started on a second EPR in France.
The Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is General Electric’s evolutionary Generation III design of a standard BWR. Three plants are operating in Japan with others under construction in Taiwan. It is reportedly being developed in four different versions: 600MW, 900MW, 1350 MW and 1700MW. A Generation III+ 1390MW European version is the Economic and Simplified BWR (ESBWR). Large German utility Eon, Areva and Siemens are to cooperate in the development of an intermediate range 1,250 MW BWR. The BWR enjoys certain advantages over the PWR, but a consequence of using steam directly from the coolant to drive the turbine is the presence of radioactive water in all areas of the plant. This could limit its adoption in some regulatory regimes.
The Advanced CANDU reactor (ACR) was designed and built by Atomic Energy Canada Ltd (AECL), and is an evolution of HWR technology dating back to 1962. It uses an innovative light water cooled, heavy water moderated system. The CANDU 6 reactor (700MW) is operating in a number of countries, but work is proceeding on a larger Generation III+ unit, the ACR-1000, with an output of approximately 1200MW.

Other Reactor Types
A form of reactor that has on occasion been put forward as most suitable for New Zealand conditions is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), which is under development in a number of countries, particularly South Africa, China and Russia. It is a variant of the High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR), in which graphite is used as the moderator and Helium gas as the coolant. Several earlier versions of the HTGR have been built but none are still in operation. In the PBMR, low enriched uranium particles are compacted at the core of a large pebble covered in three layers of graphite cladding – hundreds of these are poured into the reactor, leaving space for Helium gas to circulate between the units. Unlike all the reactors described previously, which are large and can operate only as base load units, the South African PBMR is a 110MW module that can operate in load following mode. A larger plant could be made up by a collection of such modules. The PBMR has attracted criticism5 of features of its design, and would certainly be subjected to careful scrutiny by regulators in advance of any certification. The PBMR has been enthusiastically promoted by the nuclear industry, but a recent report6 on its suitability for use in the UK had this to say:
“It was originally hoped to complete a demonstration plant by 2003, … . However there have been delays to this timetable … . Such a plant is now unlikely to be complete before 2010 at the earliest. Given a need both to accumulate operating experience on the plant and to gain safety regulatory approval in the UK, PBMR technology is unlikely to be available in the UK until close to 2020.” The report went on to express concern about sevenfold escalation of cost estimates of the demonstration plant.
The IRIS (International Reactor Innovative and Secure) PWR is an international collaborative project engaged in the design of a 335MW reactor incorporating modular construction and enhanced safety features. It is currently in the preliminary design phases. Although publicity has suggested that deployment is expected around 2012-2015, the same reservations expressed in the case of the PBMR above clearly apply to IRIS. The very moderate term “Appraisal Optimism” has been used to describe forecasts for nuclear projects.
The Australian Uranium Association recently released a Briefing Paper “Small Nuclear Power Reactors”7, containing the introductory statement:
“ There is a move to develop smaller units. These may be built independently or as modules in a larger complex, with capacity added incrementally as required.” The paper briefly describes a bewildering 32 designs of all types: LWRs, HTGRs, Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Reactors and Molten Salt Reactors, variously under development in the US(6) Russia(7), France(3), Japan(6), China(3), South Korea(1), South Africa(1), Argentina(1) and Internationally.(4). The PBMR and IRIS Reactors are included. It would require an excessive degree of Appraisal Optimism to anticipate that any of these designs could negotiate the hurdles of operational experience,
economic performance and safety analysis in time to be considered for utilisation in New Zealand before 2020 say.

Concluding Remarks
Whatever transpires, I suggest that New Zealand could only ever be a very minor player in the nuclear energy game. We would be totally dependent on major overseas corporations in a limited choice of reactor technologies, the availability of nuclear fuel, the offshore disposal of nuclear waste and the advanced expertise required for a multiplicity of complex tasks including eventual plant decommissioning. But right upfront we would have to face the issue of cost and the extent to which subsidies and state guarantees of one form or another would be required.
Arising from the decision by the UK Government to support a major new nuclear energy programme the cost issue has come under close observation there. As noted earlier, to make their equipment more economically competitive nuclear designers are looking for economies of scale, and the ratings of the reactors competing for consideration in the UK fall within the range 1200-1800MW. One published assessment8 nonetheless is that: “Attempts to estimate the cost of a new nuclear programme [in the UK] are unlikely to be accurate because there is not enough reliable, independent and up-to-date information available on the nuclear plant designs available for such calculations to be made. In addition, waste and decommissioning costs are at present not fully known.”
While committing the UK to a dramatic and rapid expansion of nuclear power, the Government insists that this will be up to the market and will not depend on taxpayer support. This position is viewed with scepticism in some quarters. Dieter Helm, Professor of Energy Policy at New College, Oxford claims that
“The nuclear energy policy is fundamentally flawed because it relies on the “fiction” that a new generation of reactors can be built without state support.” The research director of the British Economic Research Council has been brutally explicit in discussing the problem of new nuclear build9: “The financing risks of planning delays, construction overruns and of a wilting long term commitment are simply too great for (any but a few of the largest international utilities) to take on their balance sheet. A failure of the government to seduce one of these large players will force the UK to forego a nuclear replacement programme or even fund it entirely from the public purse.”
The government has insisted that the utility companies that are successful in the forthcoming bidding round will bear their ‘full share’ of decommissioning and waste disposal costs. However a recently-published cost analysis of the storage and disposal of waste, based on rates already being charged to overseas utilities, concluded10 that
“unfortunately the fully commercial price would make disposal far too expensive, killing the prospects of any new nuclear build programme in Britain.” Such concern is heightened by the fact that the bill for the cleanup and decommissioning at 19 nuclear sites around the UK, including the last generation of Magnox reactors, is 73 billion pounds and still rising, and that it is uncertain how this will be paid11. The situation in the US is not greatly different. Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the nuclear industry qualified for an estimated $12 billion in tax breaks and other support. The Price Anderson Act caps the industry’s liability at a fraction of the true cost of a major accident. A new Energy Bill that has been passed by Congress includes a provision that could make available tens of billions of dollars more in loan guarantees, and the Energy Dept. will provide up to $2 billion risk insurance against losses resulting from project delays for the first six new nuclear plant projects.
Nuclear industry representatives have stated that without these kinds of taxpayer subsidies they wouldn’t be building any new nuclear plants.
What is understood through many years of development and operation is that the overhead costs associated with smaller sized reactor units that would suit the New Zealand environment (including regulatory oversight, safety and back-up supply systems, and radiation monitoring processes) would make such units uncompetitive with other options in New Zealand. This is why overseas developments have seen units typically grouped into larger “nuclear islands” comprising two or more reactors.
For the smaller reactors discussed earlier, the nuclear industry is banking on economies resulting from a programme of mass production, but in view of all the uncertainties this appears to be wishful thinking. It is assumed that the competitive position of nuclear power as a relatively “carbon free” mode of generation would be improved by application of the cost of carbon through the Emission Trading Scheme.
This would however almost certainly be outweighed by the other compliance costs specific to the nuclear industry, and from the cost of bringing the technology into the country.
There is no reactor in view that could usefully be deployed in New Zealand in the foreseeable future.

1 Professor Emeritus, The University of Auckland; past-President, Engineers for Social Responsibility; Dist. FIPENZ
2 “Power Plant Advance Fuelling Nuclear Fears”, Michael Richardson, NZ Herald, 19/7/07
3 “The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy”, Paper No. 4, “Economics of Nuclear Power”, Sustainable Development Commission, March 2006
4 “The Race is on”, Engineering and Technology, Vol. 3 No. 2, February 2008, pp 54-57
5 http://www.ieer.org (search for PBMR)
6 “The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy”, Paper No. 4, “Economics of Nuclear Power”, Sustainable Development Commission, March 2006
7 http://www.uic.com.au/nip60.htm
8 “The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy”, A Position Paper of the Sustainable Development Commission, March 2006
9 “Nuclear Power – is the White Paper enough?”, Engineering Technology, Vol. 3, Issue 2, April/May 2008.
10 “Waste cost threat to UK nuclear plans”, Financial Times, March 26, 2008
11 “Clean-up cost fear in rush to nuclear”, Evening Standard, April 7, 2008

By Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Retired)

Introduction

Good morning. Some of you will recall my previous appearance before this Committee on 28 August last year, accompanied by the Rev Robert Ritchie, the petitioner, and Dr John Peet. Mr Ritchie apologises for not being here this morning, because of work commitments; however, he has delegated his role to me. He and the rest of the DU Education Team, DUET, are most grateful for this second opportunity to present our arguments to the Committee. I hope you have had a chance to read our submissions from that hearing, watched the short statement on DVD by Dr Rosalie Bertell, and read our supplementary submission dated 31 March.

In my previous submission I outlined my personal background as a former British Navy Commander who operated nuclear weapons, and whose final appointment was as Staff Officer (Intelligence) to Commander-in-Chief Fleet at Northwood HQ near London, in charge of round-the-clock intelligence support for the Fleet. Having taken voluntary redundancy in 1981, I was released after the Falklands War.

I then explained how I became sufficiently concerned about the hazards of nuclear electricity generation to testify in 1989 at a Public Inquiry into a second British pressurised water reactor (which was never built), opposing it on safety grounds. Then the break-up of the Soviet Union followed by the 1991 Gulf War caused me to become the first ex-British Commander with nuclear weapon experience to speak out against them.

In October 1991 I became Chair of the UK branch of the World Court Project – which was how I met Dr Kate Dewes, a Christchurch-based pioneer of the international campaign which persuaded the UN General Assembly to ask the International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear deterrence. After Kate and I were married in 1997, we established the Disarmament & Security Centre in our home in Christchurch, as the South Island branch of the NZ Peace Foundation. I immigrated in 1999, and became a NZ citizen two years later.

Since then I have been using my military experience to promote alternative thinking about security and disarmament, and to help build bridges between the military and the peace movement. My latest book, Fallen Idol: Security Without Nuclear Deterrence, will be co-published early next year by Verso Books and the Pamphleteer’s Press in the UK and US.

Supplementary Submission Highlights

We believe that, from recently emerging evidence, the DU issue looks set to surpass the inhumanity of the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam.

We therefore ask the Committee to consider the same evidence about the health risks of use of DU munitions heard by the Belgian Parliament, along with new research emerging since March 2007. Incidentally, the Belgian ban will come into force on 20 June this year.

We remind the Committee how we first became concerned about this issue: the deployment of NZ Defence Force personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. In 2005 DUET organized a speaking tour for Dr Chris Busby, the first international expert on DU to do so. In meetings with Ministers and Brigadier Anne Campbell, he recommended increasing the sensitivity of urine tests on returned personnel. This was partially accepted; however, we discovered resistance to introducing testing to the sensitivity level achieved in the UK.

We suspect this is because, as a waste product of nuclear processing, DU is very cheap and effective. The leading users of DU munitions – the US and UK military – therefore favour its use over alternative more expensive materials (see the briefing note on 120mm anti-tank munitions). Also, the US and UK governments are extremely unwilling to allow field research in Iraq and Afghanistan, which fuels suspicion that our concerns are well-founded.

NZDF Interoperability with a New Zealand Ban

Although the NZDF do not have DU munitions, joint operations with those states whose arsenals do include DU munitions could generate concerns about interoperability in the event of New Zealand instituting a national ban.

We point out, however, that in international prohibitions on weapons such as landmines, chemical and biological weapons and cluster munitions, issues of interoperability were dealt with satisfactorily. For the latest example, see Article 21 of the Cluster Munitions Convention.

New Developments

We draw the Committee’s attention to the following new developments since last August:

• A New Scientist article on 6 September 2008 highlighted research into possible causes of heavy metal toxicity by Dr Busby in collaboration with German Professor Ewald Schnug. They propose a novel mechanism whereby the largest atoms, such as those of heavy metal elements, can all emit electrons causing ionizing radiation when exposed to photons of energy from a wide spectrum of wavelengths. Ionizing radiation is well known as a source of cancer causing damage to living tissues.

• Dr Busby wrote about this and his other concerns about DU in an important article titled “Uranium weapons: why all the fuss?” in UNIDIR’s Disarmament Forum journal issue published in October last year.

• A strongly precautionary approach to the use of DU munitions was evident when member states of the UN expressed their views on DU in December 2008. A large majority (141) adopted resolution A/C.1/63/L.26 – opposed only by the US, UK, France and Israel – inviting governments and relevant international organizations to communicate their views on the potential harmful effects of the use of DU munitions to the Secretary-General by the next UN disarmament session in September this year. DUET notes that the New Zealand Government has not yet submitted its views. By contrast, Belgium made a report which included the following:

The Belgian legislative body made in the end a political appreciation of the matter which took account of the absence of scientific consensus on the effects of depleted uranium, while at the same time applying the precautionary principle, which demands a prudent attitude for as long as scientific certainties have not been established.

DUET considers this eminently wise and balanced position, from a NATO member state which hosts NATO HQ, warrants endorsement by New Zealand.

The Belgian decision, by unanimous vote, to ban DU munitions began with a bill put forward by Dirk Van der Maelen MP. He wrote on 27 March 2008 appealing to all members of the New Zealand Parliament to ban DU munitions (see Appendix 3). On 28 August Mr Van der Maelen spoke by phone to the Committee, expressing compelling reasons for New Zealand to institute a domestic ban.

Following Mr Van der Maelen, the Committee heard from US biostatistician Dr Rosalie Bertell via phonelink from Pennsylvania. Dr Bertell emphasised that the problem is “deeper and larger than the submission has indicated.”

• Since then, on 4 March a campaign was launched for Costa Rica to institute a national ban like Belgium’s. Last week, the Latin American Parliament considered a ban after Costa Rica introduced its proposal.

• Also last week, Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it will fund three research projects to help resolve the uncertainty about the health effects of DU munitions. As a NATO member state, this is a courageous initiative strongly supportive of Belgium. It will be interesting to see if in particular the Obama administration tries to stop the Basra project.

• In what was probably no coincidence, the next day it was reported that NATO is prepared to take a fresh look at the issue.

• Then last Sunday came a report that the Scottish government is under mounting pressure to back an international ban on the use of DU munitions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

With moves in Costa Rica to follow the Belgian ban, and in October this year another opportunity at the next UN Disarmament Session for states to report on the issue, we believe that New Zealand should support Belgium’s precautionary approach. We therefore urge the Committee, having considered the latest concerns regarding DU’s harmful effects, to recommend that:

1) Parliament enact a ban on the manufacture, use, storage, sale, acquisition, supply and transit of inert munitions and armour that contain depleted uranium or any other industrially manufactured uranium.

2) The New Zealand Government submit a report to the UN Secretary-General endorsing Belgium’s precautionary approach on the issue in response to paragraph 2 of UN Resolution A/C.1/63/L.26 dated 16 October 2008.

We believe these steps would contribute powerfully to worldwide pressure for an international ban, and to New Zealand’s standing as a world leader in disarmament.

The Sustainable Energy Forum (SEF) is a group of individuals and corporate organisations promoting information and supporting action which will help move New Zealand towards a sustainable energy future.

While our organisations can understand the Government wish to improve the national economy in the face of the present economic downturn, we are particularly concerned that the proposed GPS statement does not recognise the changes that are already happening.  These changes are likely to bring about significant modifications to the way goods and people move about in the future.  The Government needs to consider the effects of these changes much more thoroughly before launching into a plan for the future of land transport.

1 Employment – We can understand the Government’s wish to create employment and improve infrastructure, but roading is not the only sector of the economy that should be stimulated to create employment and provide future economic benefits.

2 Continued Reliance on Liquid Fuels – The declining availability of oil has been well documented.  In its World Energy Outlook 2008, the International Energy Agency warns of a growing world oil supply crunch from 2010 onwards. Projected decline rates of over 8% in production from existing oil fields will create increasing difficulties in maintaining even current levels of world oil production in the 2010-2030 period.  Oil prices have declined in the wake of the present economic crisis, but it would be irresponsible to think that with growing shortages and more expensive production costs, oil will not return to its former high prices.  Continuing price increases beyond these high prices can be expected and are indeed inevitable in terms of reducing supply and increased demand.  While there are possibilities for the development and use of biofuels, these are also likely to be much more expensive than present fuel prices and to be limited in availability.  It appears likely that electric vehicles will become available.  Because of increasing liquid fuel prices there will be dramatic changes in the way goods and people move about.  The economic benefits of rail, coastal shipping and public transport will inevitably become the norm and planning for these needs to take place urgently.

3 Corridors versus roads ? We believe that there will always be a need for transport corridors for long term future mobility, that include adequate bridging etc.  However a corridor is not synonymous with solely a roadway route. As mode shifts become more evident such corridors will have valuable alternative or multiple uses.

4 Fuel Prices – The fuel price spike of 2008 resulted in observable road de-congestion and greater acceptance of public transport.  We believe that the price rise was associated with an upward trend in oil prices recognising ‘peak oil’ concepts. The inevitable drop in demand as oil prices resume their upward trend could make existing roading investments run more smoothly, but there should also be a serious re-evaluation of the congestion problems as perceived pre-2008 and as forecasted over the lifetime of new investments.
There is a danger that reduced traffic due to increased fuel costs will render new road capacity extra to requirements.  Funding that could have been used to provide alternative modes will have been used up in creating stranded assets.

5 Revised Modelling and Design – The transport models that were used to develop current road building projects used assumed traffic growth rates based on the economy and fuel prices of earlier years.  New modelling and analysis must be done based on new, more current trends and information.

6 Innovation – New ideas are born out of need for change and challenged thinking.  Carrying on with investment plans when the fundamentals have changed is not the best way to stimulate economic growth.  Investment in research is the key.  Training of practitioners and funding for transport planning should be increasing dramatically to meet the challenges of economic growth within the realities of the world economic environment.

7 Public Transport – Two critical functions of Public Transport also align with priorities of national economic growth.  The two critical functions are alleviating congestion on roads and providing transport access to economic activities for people who can’t use or afford personal automobile transport.  The proportion of the population in this category will inevitably increase as ‘peak oil’ starts to take effect. Integrated, quality designed and operated Public Transport should be understood to be a vital part of the national transport infrastructure.  Funding for Public Transport should be increased markedly, but with the important requirement of integrated modelling and design.  NZ’s main cities and also major provincial towns must become resilient, vibrant local regional centres where public transport systems are the backbone and lifeblood of the economic activities.

8 Active Transport – The GPS takes the position that active modes and bike infrastructure do not fit with the priorities for national economic growth.  This is at odds with the international experience.  The most profitable and economically viable developments in cities across Australasia, the Americas and Europe in the past ten years have been urban “re-developments” where urban villages and pedestrian common and commercial spaces are integrated with housing and service centres.  The property values and commercial activity of these re-development areas has increased during the recent fuel price spike and economic down-turn.  Active transport infrastructure that is “imposed” on personal automobile architecture is indeed largely wasted effort.  The GPS should actually be increasing the walking and biking-related funding dramatically, but incorporating it with urban re-development requirements.

9 Rail and Sea Freight – The lack of spending on what is potentially the greatest opportunity for efficiency improvement in the nation is negligent.  The statement that 80% of current freight in New Zealand is shipped by road is a flawed premise to the argument for neglecting the rail system.  Of course the economic factors of the past several decades have led to this condition.  Those conditions are changing.  The funding for rail and sea freight (and passenger transport) should be dramatically increased until a far greater proportion of freight is moved off the road at least as far as inter-urban transport and long distance bulk haulage is concerned.  There is no country in the world with an effective rail network that wishes they had a system like New Zealand’s where the only real freight option is the road!

10 Regional Air Transport
Regional aviation, like all air transport, is in a parlous state, kept viable by the recent fall in oil prices.  It cannot be relied upon for either long term public transport or for moving freight.

11 Summary – It may seem efficient to direct investment to easing congestion on national roads in the short term with historical growth patterns in mind because of assumed travel time savings, and optimal fuel consumption.  But it would not be a prudent or robust risk based planning approach if it does not take into account the rational concerns highlighted by the International Energy Agency, by building resilience into the transport system and thereby reducing system vulnerability to widely anticipated and by now often experienced liquid fuel supply shocks.  We urge the Government to take a less hasty and single minded approach to the completion of the GPS and take time to consider the balance of the inherent risks and vulnerabilities of the planned investment profile.  Closer examination may find that the labour component is relatively small in comparison with expenditures on materials, like bitumen or concrete, and heavy construction equipment.

On behalf of Engineers for Social Responsibility and Sustainable Energy Forum

John La Roche
National Secretary Engineers for Social Responsibility